Avainsana: review article

Campaign communication, entertainmentization, Instagram, personalization, political branding, presidential election

Elisa Kannasto
elisa.kannasto [a] seamk.fi
PhD, Head of Degree Programme, Master School 
Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences

How to cite: Kannasto, Elisa. 2025. ”Instagramming Persona in the 2024 Finnish Presidential Election”. WiderScreen 28 (1–2). https://widerscreen.fi/numerot/1-2-2025-widerscreen-28-numerot/instagramming-persona-in-the-2024-finnish-presidential-election/

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Political campaigns are shaped by media. Social media allows politicians to manage their publicity, but it also requires skills to engage with constituents and encourage voting. Politicians pursue various tactics to attract and influence constituents on different platforms. In a persona-centric presidential election, candidates must maximize visibility and persuade voters. This study examines how presidential election candidates Alexander Stubb and Pekka Haavisto built their political personas through personalization and entertainment during the 2024 campaign. The analysis focuses on entertaining forms like emotional appeal, authenticity, visual aesthetics, and lifestyle integration that were used on their Instagram accounts. Instagram, as a recently politicized platform in Finland, seemed to serve as a central arena for constructing the presidential persona. While both candidates had unique styles and tactics to showcase their strengths and preferences in public performances and communication, elements of entertainmentization can be found in both profiles. These elements include glimpses of the private sphere and the campaign backstage, humour, social media trends, engaging content, entertaining event types and their shares of participating to entertaining formats in traditional media.

Over the past two decades, political communication has been significantly shaped by the emergence of social media platforms. In political communication this has strengthened the debate on what scholars call the entertainmentization of politics, where political content increasingly mirrors the logic of commercial media entertainment (Herkman 2008; Karvonen 2009). Often the entertainmentization of politics has been connected to the personal lives of politicians and media has made public entertainment out of several relationship scandals of politicians (Herkman 2011, 10; Isotalus 2017). This together with the persona orientated communication on social media (see Marshall, Moore & Barbour 2019; Enli & Skogerbø 2013) has also sparked discussion on personalization of politics (van Aelst, Sheafer & Stanyer 2012; Kannasto, Paatelainen & Isotalus 2023).

Instagram, with its emphasis on visual storytelling, has become a central platform where political figures craft personalized, emotionally resonant content to connect with voters. The platform, showcasing a wide array of influencers promoting beauty products and lifestyle, has stabilized its position as a political arena (Kannasto 2025b), where politicians and parties, alongside influencers, use visual communication and trends to attract attention to their cause and opinions. This trend was particularly evident in the 2024 Finnish presidential election campaign, in which Instagram served not only as a campaign tool but as a strategic arena shaping candidates’ communication logic. The profiles on social media do not just present candidates and their followers but collect central campaign strategies and shared information, create campaign atmosphere (Kannasto & Pöyry 2025), direct event planning, host live discussions and promote candidate-constituent interaction.

The establishment of social media as a central arena for campaign communication (see Laaksonen, Kannasto & Knuutila 2025) has increased various forms of entertaining communication and expanded their publicity (Klinger & Svensson 2015). This has manifested in, for example, portrayals of private life, such as videos of hobbies or family moments, content describing a politician’s typical day, backstage portrayals of the political profession, personal likes and attributes, and performances in situations that are not typical of the political role. While social media offers opportunities for personal and engaging communication with audiences (Enli & Skogerbø 2013), Finnish politicians have typically adhered to topic-orientated communication (Kannasto et al. 2023).

However, the candidate-orientated nature (see von Schoultz & Strandberg 2024) and national perspective of the presidential elections require candidates to utilize various forms of publicity and seek the attention and votes of the audience in multiple ways. Herkman (2011) explores how the entertainmentization of politics influences campaign messaging in Finland. He argues that the presentation of politics as a form of entertainment, combined with social media’s visual language, has changed the way political communication is consumed. This has led to campaigns that are as much about performing a relatable personality as they are about policy, with candidates carefully curating their public image to appeal to both emotion and reason. The added social media communication may have led to more attention and interest towards politicians, which may have also brought increased political knowledge that Rapeli’s (2025) findings show for the young, low-educated and low-income respondents in 2020 compared to 2008.

With this text, I open a discussion on how Instagram may serve as a central platform in politics for constructing engaging political personas. By using the concepts of entertainment and personalization from political communication research, the analysis focuses on the 2024 presidential election campaign in Finland and the two leading candidates, Alexander Stubb and Pekka Haavisto. Through qualitative content analysis, the study investigates how these candidates constructed political personas and framed their campaign communication during the 2024 election campaign. The analysis focuses on discursive strategies that highlight emotional appeal, authenticity, visual aesthetics, and lifestyle integration.

Herkman (2011) highlights that election publicity is intermedial and requires multi-channel communication that considers different audiences. While a multi-platform approach could construct a more holistic view on campaign communication, this study focuses on Instagram as a central arena of all campaigning. The importance of Instagram in the Finnish campaign communication for politicians was solidified during the 2023 Parliamentary election (Kannasto 2026). Therefore, it is justified to map out its relevance in the following presidential election, in addition to the platform’s undeniable position in persona construction (Marshall Moore & Barbour 2019). The hybrid media environment (see Chadwick 2013) of the 2020s calls for an update to Herkman’s (2011) examination of political publicity, which this study approaches from the perspective of entertainment. This study aims to examine the forms of entertainment in the Instagram campaigning of the 2024 presidential candidates. The research questions are as follows: 1) How was Instagram used in the presidential campaign of the two leading candidates? 2) What kind of entertaining campaign content was seen in the elections? 

The Finnish Presidential elections provide a compelling case due to the significant role of social media in these elections. All candidates spread their campaigns to the most used social media platforms. In the 2023 Parliamentary elections, 23 % of voters followed election campaigning significantly on social media (Isotalo et al. 2023). Another interesting point is the candidate-centered orientation in Finland. First, Finnish voters tend to shift their votes between elections, and in the parliamentary campaigns candidates compete even against their own party list candidates (Söderlund 2023). Second, since the President in Finland holds less power in internal politics, the role is often seen as more representative and less crucial for party representation. Therefore, the presidential campaigns have a strong focus on personas. This fits well with social media, which has been suggested to encourage candidates to self-personalize due to its nature and logic (Enli & Skogerbø 2013; Metz, Kruikemeir & Lecheler 2020).

Media and Entertainmentization of Politics

In Finnish politics, elements of entertainment have taken various forms, from television entertainment shows to intimate media performances (Herkman 2011; 2010; 2008), and now to entertaining ”my day” -videos and TikTok trends. In political campaigning, with the need to appeal widely to constituents, different artists have been brought to perform at campaign events, celebrities publicly endorse candidates, candidates appear in television entertainment shows, and they open up about their lives and personal relationships in magazines. While these elements remain essential parts of campaigning, new elements brought by social media have been introduced. In platforms like Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, politicians can use their profiles to connect with the public through personal posts, synchronous and asynchronous comment threads, private messages and live broadcasts. While at first social media seemed to be more of a new arena for one-way information channel for Finnish politicians (Nelimarkka et al. 2020), audiovisual platforms like Instagram and TikTok have brought new types of possibilities for candidate-constituent interaction. More visual communication and live broadcasts are used to create connection and seemingly authentic personas (Kannasto 2021). In addition, backstage glimpses and less formal representations of politicians have entered their campaign communication in social media. 

The importance of the media for politicians is evident. Intermediality refers to the interconnectedness of different media forms and platforms in the dissemination of political messages. Herkman (2011) emphasizes that modern election campaigns must navigate a complex media landscape where traditional and new media intersect. Chadwick’s (2013) idea of hybrid media explains this further as traditional media and social media complementing and feeding each other. Kannasto (2021) discusses added publicity, where politicians share beneficial traditional media stories of themselves in their own profiles, thus seeking more publicity for them (Paatelainen, Kannasto & Isotalus 2024). This intermedial approach allows campaigns to reach diverse audiences through various channels, enhancing the overall impact of their messages.

Intertextuality involves the relationship between different texts and how they reference or build upon each other. In the context of political campaigns, intertextuality can be seen in how candidates’ messages are echoed and amplified across different media platforms. For example, a candidate’s speech might be referenced in social media posts, news articles, and television programs, creating a web of interconnected content that reinforces the campaign’s key messages (Van Zoonen 2005, 12). By examining the interplay of intermediality, intertextuality, and hybrid media, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how these elements are used to communicate entertainment and public figures in political marketing and influence during the 2024 presidential campaign.

While the entertainmentization of politics and social media communication in politics often draw criticism for overshadowing topical issues or undermining the importance of politics, they can also bring new interest and audiences to political topics and politicians, and attract voters. By making politics more approachable, democracy may strengthen with more people participating in discussions and decision-making. For example, candidates with less resources have been found to make their way into politics with the help of social media. However, in the presidential elections, the leading candidate budgets ran well over a million and their brands were firmly grounded to their earlier established media visibility. The topic-orientated focus in Finnish politics (Kannasto et al. 2023; Isotalus 2017) also challenges candidates who try to establish themselves through pure celebrity politics. Nevertheless, there has long been a tradition that candidates also seek additional visibility with the help of entertainment. For example, entertainment shows like Tuttu juttu and entertainment magazines’ couple interviews have often presented political candidates during election seasons (Isotalus 2017; Herkman 2011).

Personalization in Finnish politics, as discussed by Pekka Isotalus (2017), and later also Elisa Kannasto (2021), illustrates how political figures are increasingly expected to perform their political identities in ways that are visually appealing and emotionally resonant. However, as also noted, personalization in Finnish politics has more to do with individuals representing political topics and agenda being narrated through them than with politicians’ private lives and personal qualities (Paatelainen, Kannasto & Isotalus 2024). There is a gap in research on Finnish presidential election campaigns and how significant the backstage scenes and visual politics are for persona construction in the age of social media. In addition, so far, studies covering election communication on social media in Finland have been connected to the parliamentary elections (Paatelainen et al. 2024; Nelimarkka et al. 2019) or municipal elections (Nieminen, Kannasto & Isotalus 2022).Considering that in 2024, the presidential election result was historically close, with only a 3.2 % difference between the candidates (Tilastokeskus 2024), more studies are also needed on presidential election campaigning. The small difference highlights the importance of successful campaigns, as well as the importance of analyzing and learning from them.

Social Media Campaign Communication 

In general, political campaigns have seen a shift from emphasizing policy debates to focusing on individual candidates as brands, a shift that plays into the broader cultural expectations of authenticity and personal connection. Kannasto (2021) highlights that social media encourages Finnish politicians to frame themselves as ’real people’ through social media platforms, blurring the lines between their personal and political lives. In the broader context of social media’s role in politics, Instagram not only reflects the entertainmentization of political communication but also offers political discussion to the users. This phenomenon goes beyond the mere use of social media as a platform to communicate messages; it indicates a shift toward political branding, where politicians not only communicate but also entertain, blending political discourse with entertainment formats. While direct candidate-constituent interaction and connecting through private life content has been seen as one of the appealing points of social media campaigning (Peng 2021), Finnish politicians have often refrained from it (Nelimarkka et al. 2020; Kannasto 2021). Similar findings on politicians not discussing their private life have been found in 2014 and 2019 in the European Union elections (Russman, Klinger & Koc-Michalska 2024).

In Finland, presidential elections hold unique significance compared to the parliamentary elections, as the president is not just a political figurehead but a symbol of national unity and a key player in foreign policy. The representative importance of the elected president is often highlighted in the campaigns and public discussion during the presidential election, which often also touch on the candidates’ appearance, rhetoric skill, language skills, family, and values. Thus, unlike in parliamentary elections, where party affiliation dominates, Finnish presidential elections emphasize the individual candidate’s character, leadership qualities, and personal appeal. For example, the preceding President Sauli Niinistö was running as an independent candidate on his second term in 2018 to highlight his role as a candidate free from party ties. Similarly, Pekka Haavisto was running as a candidate of an electoral association in the 2024 election to break away from the ties of the political party. In Finland, the president is elected by direct popular vote for a six-year term, and their role is largely ceremonial but crucial in terms of shaping Finland’s international presence. However, the shift in defence policy and Finland’s NATO membership in 2023 brought more focus to national security and the president’s role during the 2024 presidential elections. 

Historically, the communication in presidential campaigns in Finland have centered around mass media, but since the 2012 elections, social media has played an increasing role in voter engagement and candidate visibility (Kannasto 2026). However, it has remained unclear what type of content is effective in voter engagement and support as most studies seem to agree that strategies and results are highly individual between politicians (Kannasto 2021; 2025). Regardless, social media has been significant for candidates; in the 2011–2012 presidential campaign Pekka Haavisto was among the first candidates to utilize social media for campaigning. It has been argued that it was essential for him getting to the second round and truly challenging Sauli Niinistö in the election (Suominen et al. 2013, 168, 253). The campaign of Haavisto seemed to learn from the successful social media campaign of Barack Obama in 2008 and he mobilized a lot of supporters on Facebook. On the other hand, Alexander Stubb was the first Finnish politician to bring Twitter into Finnish politics and was publicly called the most active social media politician of his time (Hämäläinen 2017; Yle 16.6.2014).

Political figures are no longer just party representatives; they are media personalities who must manage their image, public perception, and personal narrative (Isotalus 2017; Kannasto, Paatelainen & Isotalus 2023). Moreover, the integration of personal life with political messaging on Instagram has reshaped how candidates are perceived, offering them a platform where they can craft authentic, relatable personas that are visually engaging and emotionally charged (Enli 2017; Peng 2021). By 2024, Instagram has stabilized its role as an essential tool for building political brands, particularly for candidates trying to reach new demographics and strengthen connections with their already existing ones (Kannasto 2026). Instagram’s role as a political tool reflects broader shifts in social media’s impact on political communication globally. Platforms like Instagram facilitate a more direct and personal form of communication between politicians and their constituents, allowing for the development of an individualized political brand. The Instagram presence of well-known political figures like Victor Orbán, Justin Trudeau, Santiago Abascal and Volodymir Zelenskyi has attracted wide research interest (Lalancette & Raynauld 2019; Sampietro & Sánchez-Castillo 2020; Szebeni & Salojärvi 2022; Plazas‐Olmedo & López‐Rabadán 2023).

Data and methodology

This study focuses on the Instagram posts of the two leading candidates who made it to the second round of the 2024 presidential elections, Alexander Stubb (National Coalition Party candidate) and Pekka Haavisto (electoral association candidate). In a larger upcoming study, the other parliamentary party candidates and their social media data will also be analyzed. The data for this study was collected as screenshots from the presidential candidates public Instagram profiles @alexander.stubb and @pekka.haavisto. 

The data analyzed in this study consists of the feed posts from three months prior to the election day 10.2.2024. Between 10.11.2023-10.2.2024 Alexander Stubb published 444 posts and Pekka Haavisto 300 posts. These posts were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. The theoretical framework of the study relies on the blurring boundaries between politics and entertainment (Van Zoonen 2005, 12), the concept of hybrid media (Chadwick 2013, 89), and the intermediality of election communication (Herkman 2011). 

Analysis 

Candidate Stubb did not include descriptions of his past political role in the same way as Haavisto, possibly because of the negative response to his previous political role which also came up in the media discussion around the speculation leading to his candidacy in the presidential election. His previous experience in the Finnish political scene includes a challenging government period. The data, as well as the presidential debates during the campaign, imply that Stubb wanted to highlight that the president’s role in diplomacy and foreign politics was more natural to him and aligned with his expertise and academic background. His campaign focused on these aspects rather than on previous political achievements or former role in domestic politics. When this experience was mentioned in the data, it mainly took place in the endorsements from his former political colleagues (Image 2).

The posts on Pekka Haavisto’s account showed a connection with culture and arts, highlighted his professional expertise as well as his international political experience in peace negotiations and defense politics, and presented endorsements from both cultural celebrities and ordinary citizens. Endorsements also played a smaller role in his Instagram feed than those posted on Stubb’s profile (Image 2). They generally appeared as selfies, rather than official statements of endorsement that had been created as a distinct type of post on Stubb’s profile. Both candidates had their own political networks of other politicians, which were used to construct their persona and supporter base (Image 3a, 3b).

The data highlights that both leading candidates had background in politics, earned media coverage easily and had their distinct follower and voter base. Thus, the main task in the campaigns seemed to be more about amplifying the messages, confirming the motivation and promises to the public and reminding the constituents what kind of representation they would get from each candidate. It seems that in both candidate’s cases, the various endorsements, public figures, and emotion provoking content were used to motivate constituents to join the candidate’s movement and to vote. In addition, the campaigns emphasized the strong will of both candidates not to highlight oppositions or engage in negative campaigning – both openly condemned negative statements and mobilization in their own campaigns.

Overall, Alexander Stubb’s posts showcased a profile featuring sports (Image 4a), Finnish nature scenery and activities, business life and athlete endorsements (Image 2), media performances, such as podcasts, entertainment television along with a more relaxed background portrayal with informal clothing (Image 3b), home setting photos and sport training (Image 5). This type of private life content can make the candidate more approachable, an ordinary person, which can be viewed positively especially in Finland, which represents a low hierarchy society. The wife of Stubb, Suzanne Innes-Stubb was included in the campaign through seemingly natural occasions where the couple participated in events together or Suzanne gave comments in videos. These added personality and humor to the campaign, for example when Susanne stated in a video that she would not say who she voted for because of the Finnish ballot secrecy. In addition, several photos highlighted the community atmosphere, with crowd appeal and smiling or “hype-like” people, emphasized by the number of crowd photos in the data.

The data from the account of @pekkahaavisto included several images presenting Haavisto’s spouse Antonio Flores, who participated in the campaign by, for instance, hosting events. They also attended events and interviews as a couple. One example was a video series of short clips where they would answer intimate or humorous questions that started with “Which one of you is most likely to?” (Image 6). These posts together with several posts depicting only Haavisto or him with someone else created an intimate atmosphere in Haavisto’s feed compared to Stubb, whose posts often included crowds and several people and fewer, selected portrayals of only him or him with his wife. While the data in @alexstubb included several glimpses of the private sphere (Image 5; Kannasto 2021), Haavisto also commented on the private in, for example, a post explaining his clothing style: ”The deeper meaning of my choice of ties has been pondered in both the blue and red tie. The reason for the choices is not a political stand but is standing right here. Luckily, I have a good critic at home” (@pekkahaavisto 8.2.2024).

The two presidential candidates used various platforms to spread their messages but often brought the content on their Instagram that seems to function as a central communication space of diverse forms and styles of content. In the published posts, content that can be interpreted as entertaining was found in both the relaxed content and official media formats intended for broad audiences (Street 2012, 34). Both candidates also published their own media, vodcast (podcast also offering a video from) “A-talk” by Alexander Stubb and an audio form “Saturday letter” by Pekka Haavisto which were shared and marketed in their Instagram. In “Alex Talk,” Stubb discussed with known Finnish people like artist Samu Haber and social media influencer Auri Kananen (Image 7a), which could also engage the followers of these celebrities. These can be viewed as similar to celebrity endorsements. Haavisto’s Saturday letter included story telling from past experiences and views about current issues that were meant to represent the candidate’s persona.

The data implies that both candidates built their persona and promoted engagement also through selective glimpses to the backstage (see Marshall, Moore & Barbour 2019; Kannasto 2021) of the campaign trail (Image 5, 6, 8a, 8b). By bringing these non-public images to their audiences, the candidates may try to build a closer connection and give the impression that the public gets to participate in their personal life. These types of backstage images are more rare than the public performances and media images that are available to anyone. For a politician they can offer an asset to engage more followers; they function as sort of promises to the audience that they see what is actually happening – not just what is public. However, as images 8a and 8b show, even these are carefully crafted in the feed and selected to deliver a specific message; the need to rest like anyone else in the midst of hard work and the need to prepare for media performances.

The forms of entertainment in the campaign can be classified using both media formats and content types, including for example traditional women’s magazine relationship interviews, television entertainment programs (Dahlgren 2009, 56), as well as new forms such as participating in TikTok trends and podcast appearances. Additionally, traditional market events were renewed by creating a campaign atmosphere with, for example, sports events (Image 4a). Campaigns also utilized various public figures who functioned as endorsers and content creators on their social media accounts (Enli & Skogerbø 2013). In addition, well-known politicians became valuable networks to feature in selfies and endorsement posts with the candidates (Image 3a, 3b, 4b). Last, backstage glimpses offered descriptions from the campaign trail (8a, 8b), introductions to the candidates’ personal preferences, and feeling-orientated posts about campaigning and the public.

Results

This study examined the forms of entertainment seen in the 2024 presidential campaign focusing on Instagram. The platform was used to spread traditional media content, performances on debates or other television shows, portray public campaign events and appearances and to share more personal moments and feelings that were fitted into the visual communication mode of Instagram. While the posts in both accounts in the data mainly followed political everyday settings already typical for the Finnish political Instagram (see Lindholm, Carlson & Högväg 2021), they also show the development and stretching boundaries of private and professional (see Kannasto 2021) that have been seen in the politicized Instagram in Finland.

The data shows that the two candidates and their Instagram posts differed in style, portrayal of expertise, lifestyle content, endorsement categories, included personas, and networks. For example, while Haavisto would often be represented in photos wearing a suit and in official settings, the photos of Stubb also included the backstage setting and relaxed outlook. This may also be the result of the sports dimension in Stubb’s campaign; the events included cross country skiing and other exercise activities while Haavisto’s campaign included cultural events, like concerts and his DJ performances.

While aiming to attract the majority of constituents in Finland, the distinct styles in reality appeal to different demographics. However, it is noteworthy that because of their extensive experience in publicity and politics, both candidates had well known recognizable personal brands and they were the leading candidates in the presidential race from the start. This may have influenced the type of content and the ease in selection of content and limiting certain topics. It also needs to be recognized that both candidates were experienced performers with the media. Simultaneously both candidates already had a dedicated supporter base in the beginning of the campaign, so the campaigns were more about emphasizing the selected brand elements instead of building them from scratch. Both candidates also had visible networks and political capital that they could utilize in the campaign. This emphasis is evident, for example, in posts that highlight professional expertise.

Discussion

The data from the 2024 election demonstrated how candidates like Stubb and Haavisto can use Instagram to shape their public personas. Both candidates used the platform for curated posts that showcased their personal values, interests, and lifestyles, in addition to their political messages. These could be shaped as entertainment by choosing the format, adding visual focus or formatting the content into a private sphere or entertaining style. Stubb’s campaign, for instance, focused on appealing to both younger and older demographics, using visuals to emphasize his leadership capabilities while also presenting relatable, behind-the-scenes moments. The campaign theme “Together” was emphasized with displaying crowds, creating events where people were in a good mood, for example the joint skiing and walking events. Haavisto, in contrast, leveraged his Instagram presence to emphasize personal connections and emotional engagement with followers, presenting a narrative that was as much about humanizing himself as it was about his policy agenda. The photos concentrated on Haavisto alone or him with another person, portraying more intimate connections and highlighting political profession and background. 

The findings on both candidates support earlier study on the Instagram of Zelenskyi, where he was found to strategically combine the backstage with the professional settings, and to use the platform tools that support communication (Sampietro & Sánchez-Castillo 2020). Both approaches also support Kannasto and Pöyry’s (2025) findings on social media mood-setting in campaigns and their difference between individual politicians. This may be because, as Bossetta and Schmøkel (2023) conclude, different audiences respond and reward the emotion from politicians differently on different platforms. While the data implies cross posting between platforms, it must be noted that the candidates in question may also seem different if a different platform was chosen as the focus point. 

Drawing on the theory of political personalization (Langer 2010; van Aelst et al. 2012), the data implies that Instagram facilitates the branding of candidates as individuals – political figures who are constructed and perceived as multi-dimensional personas. Karvonen (2009) has described this type of focus and attention on individual politicians as the entertainmentization of politics. Each candidate seemed genuine, highlighting their personal preferences making them also this way approachable and relatable to those sharing the same values. This trend has reshaped campaign strategies, where candidates are required to create a cohesive, appealing image that resonates emotionally with voters. For example, the elements presented on Instagram for Alexander Stubb seem to have been strategically planned to serve Instagram as a central publicity forum. The events attract crowds which can then be shown in the imagery, convenient traditional media clips can be used to highlight appealing personal representations and along with high quality studio images, quick snapshots of the sleeping candidate on the back seat of the car bring a humane perspective to the audience. 

Instagram also serves as an arena for added exposure (see Kannasto 2021) in the presidential campaign; the platform affords the candidates to share other media content, to control their representations through edits and other tools, to promote interaction, and to earn media visibility with the content they publish. This in turn highlights Herkman’s (2008) conclusions on mediatization and personalization and suggests that the transformation has even deepened – in 2024 campaign tactics are deeply connected with media and communicated through so much that even live meetings may carry an undertone of strategic media broadcasting. At the same time, entertainmentization becomes essential – drawing attention while doing and debating politics may be vital with intertwining political and media logic and winning the battle for attention. This interplay of intermediality, intertextuality and hybrid media challenges studying the campaigns, as content becomes almost untraceable to its origins and highly interconnected. However, in the presidential campaigns of Haavisto and Stubb, Instagram seemed like a central meeting point, the digital campaign tent with the essential campaign content unifying endorsements, public events, backstage stories, media performances and candidates’ feelings and representations.

The data implies that visual storytelling and emotional engagement are becoming central strategies in modern campaigning, especially in candidate-centered campaigns like the presidential campaign. When political topics seem complicated and narrow in scope, even far from the constituent’s everyday life, or especially if differences of opinion seem minimal, it may be more appealing and effective to discuss lifestyle, portray values through personal life (c.f. Kannasto 2021) and focus on presenting political expertise through background presentations and career narration instead of political arguments. In Finland, the president’s role is not tightly connected with domestic politics, for example taxation, health care or employment and the candidates seemed to make sure not to touch those issues to avoid any unnecessarily lost votes. In addition, in a multi-party system the differences between candidates on topic issues falling under the presidential rule may seem insignificant with everyone promoting the national interest and caution in world politics and highlighting the role of parliamentary representation in domestic policy so the big separation points are bound to remain in persona representations and brand. This adds the importance of visibility and publicity for the candidates so the strategies may also focus on added exposure instead of political influence during the campaign. The focus on decision-making and policy will come later. 

As the data indicates, the fear of entertainment possibly overshadowing political agenda and affecting decision making also has its place in Finland. Therefore, more studies are needed to explore the engagement and possible effects on voting of the increased social media campaign. It also remains essential to map out the transformation in styles of social media campaigning. Especially with the fragmentation of social media communications and the focus being directed to and through various platforms forces to add platform-specific and comparative research that also focuses on the highly multimodal content and strategies behind producing it. The added professionalism in political communication focusing on campaign times in Finland (Kannasto 2025) would also need to be studied more to understand the effects of budget and voting results. While social media seems to steer and reshape campaigning, the audience needs more understanding in what and how strategies are formed and executed to gain power in decision-making and society.

The 2024 Finnish presidential election, viewed on Instagram and the concept of political branding, illustrates how social media platforms can serve as central arenas where personal narratives, branding, and entertainment intersect, ultimately shaping electoral outcomes. Social media brings the candidates to the most intimate space of every constituent; content is browsed everywhere where individuals take their phones. Through humane images, hype crowd portrayals and videos where the candidate speaks directly to the camera, the candidates can break the barriers of official communication by mediating an almost intimate direct candidate-constituent connection where the voter can feel like being present in every campaign event and the community created around the candidate. It remains to be seen how strong of a position entertainment has on politics or if the focus should rather be on studying professionalization and its effects in political communication (c.f. Herkman 2008; Kannasto 2025). The current trend seems to imply that social media attracts more entertaining content. And as parties and politicians continue to look for ways to draw attention and engagement (Kannasto 2025), new strategies, styles and attempts continue to push the traditional norms of political communication. 

References

All links verified 6.8.2025. 

Data

@alexstubb Instagram feed 10.11.2023-10.2.2024.

@pekkahaavisto Instagram feed 10.11.2023-10.2.2024.

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Edutainment, educational games, game development, self-ethnography

Adam Flamma
adam.flamma [a] dsw.edu.pl
PhD, Assistant professor
DSW University of Lower Silesia
Wroclaw, Poland

How to cite: Flamma, Adam. 2025. ”From Code to Classroom: A Game Developer’s Exploration of Edutainment”. WiderScreen 28 (1–2). https://widerscreen.fi/numerot/1-2-2025-widerscreen-28-numerot/from-code-to-classroom-a-game-developers-exploration-of-edutainment/

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The issue of entertainmentization of education is a challenge for cultural researchers, especially in the face of the development of new media technologies, which raises concerns about obscuring educational values. The learning vs. playing tension is widely discussed in the literature, usually addressing the perspectives of teachers and students. The third group of people involved in the edutainment – game developers – is usually omitted. Therefore, although the educational view on edutainment is widely represented in social sciences and humanities, the game developers’ perspective remains a research gap. Using the self-ethnography approach and literature review, this study discusses edutainment from the perspective of the game developer. Describing the examples of educational video game design and development, the study shows how educational values guide every step of the game creation process, from the preproduction and production, through launch and collaboration with the receivers at the end. Each of these stages brings different challenges for game developers, who aim to support the learning and memory skills of future players. The article discusses the author’s own experience against the background of edutainment literature. The role of users’ feedback is also discussed, both for players and teachers, as the educational games are designed and created for them.

Introduction

Education is undergoing a significant transformation with traditional teaching methods increasingly giving way to more engaging, dynamic approaches. This shift is largely driven by the concept of ”entertainmentization,” where elements of entertainment are integrated into educational practices to make learning more appealing and effective (Singhal & Rogers 2002). From gamified learning platforms to interactive simulations and multimedia-rich content, the boundaries between education and entertainment are becoming increasingly blurred (Loeckx 2016). This trend reflects a broader societal shift toward prioritizing engagement and accessibility in all forms of communication (Rana et al. 2010) and learning (Seale & Cooper 2010; Seale 2013).

The entertainmentization of education stems from the recognition that traditional, lecture-based approaches may no longer resonate with today’s learners, who are accustomed to highly interactive and visually stimulating digital environments. By incorporating storytelling (Gallagher 2011), gamification (Oliveira et al. 2023), and immersive technologies (Baxter & Hainey 2024), educators aim to foster deeper engagement and motivation among students. These methods not only make learning enjoyable but also cater to diverse learning styles, ensuring that education becomes a more inclusive and adaptive process. However, this approach also raises questions about balancing entertainment with the depth and rigor required for meaningful learning (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 2006).

As this trend continues to evolve, it is reshaping the role of educators, the expectations of learners, and the tools used in classrooms and beyond. This is a challenge not only for teachers and learners, but also – or maybe above all – educational game developers. They are under pressure to follow assumptions of both education and entertainment at every stage of game design and development. This article explores the implications of edutainment on a game design process, from my personal experience based on the conducted literature review.

Literature review

To provide a theoretical background for my self-ethnographic analysis, I have conducted a systematic literature review using the Scopus database. I used the search term educational video games which resulted in 359 documents. Limiting the results to English decreased the sample to 328 titles. Then, the subject area criterion was applied, limiting the sample to social sciences and arts and humanities, which resulted in 153 documents. Exclusion of conference reviews, books and editorials resulted in 148 documents. The 148 abstracts were chosen for initial reading. The initial qualitative analysis resulted in exclusion of 4 publications. Finally, 144 publications were included in the literature review and the results are organized thematically as it best serves the purpose of the article. I do not aim to cite all of the studied papers, as the review is not the main aim of this article, but it provides the background for my self-ethnographic analysis. The review of selected samples  resulted in recognition of 4 main themes. These themes are not mutually exclusive and may overlap in each paper, however their recognition outlines some of the main thematic trends in the studies on educational video games.

Learners’ perspective

Lots of studies were devoted to players’ experience in educational video games. A study  by Terzeieva et al. (2022) had proven that players  spend on a weekly basis  much more time playing entertainment games than playing educational games. According to their respondents, the educational material should align with the players’ initial knowledge of the learning domain, their ages, and, at a minimum, their learning styles. The necessary condition for players’ positive attitude towards educational video games is perceived relevance (Martí-Parreño et al. 2018).

Studies were largely focused on the motivational role of video games. Enjoyment was identified as a motivational factor (Ebrahimzadeh & Alavi 2016; Amaya-Olarte et al. 2024). Educational video games positively affect not only players’ motivation, but also acquisition, and application of learning (Cachay-Gutierrez & Cabanillas-Carbonell 2024). The incentive structure of points awarded is successful (O’Rourke et al. 2016). Learners prefer game-based learning over traditional teaching (Lopez-Fernandez et al. 2021). The motivation was studied both in-game, as well as in large scale, such as pursuing professional careers due to the gaming experience (Fonseca et al. 2018). Students assessed educational video games used in online courses as helpful in understanding course content (Cartwright & Fabian 2017).

The learners’ experience was studied in various aspects of education, including learning mathematics (e.g. Beserra et al. 2019), languages (Ebrahimzadeh & Alavi 2016), computer science (Lopez-Fernandez et al. 2023), astronomy (Herder & Rau 2022), or interest in theatre (Manero et al. 2015).

Teachers’ perspective

At the other end of the spectrum of studies on educational video games, there is research on teachers’ experience and attitudes. Older studies were focused on challenges of video games’ implementation in the classroom (Tüzün 2007; del Blanco et al. 2012). Teachers’ intentions to use educational video games in their classes depend on perceived usefulness. Age was found to influence the relationship between teachers’ perceived ease of use and the perceived usefulness of educational video games (Sánchez-Mena et al. 2017). However, another study suggests that gender and age were not found to moderate teachers’ attitude and behavioral intention (Sánchez-Mena et al. 2019). Teachers’ perception of ease of use highlights the need for targeted training and resources. The moderate view of usefulness compared to the difficulty of use suggests that without proper training, it may be challenging for teachers to effectively integrate games into their teaching (Babazadeh et al. 2024).

Effectiveness

Literature often raises the question of how effective educational video games are. I treat this as a separate issue, as it does not refer to either attitudes, intentions or experiences, but the knowledge and skills acquisition.

The effectiveness of educational video games is multifarious. They facilitate learning but also affect the perception of the attractiveness of the subject, e.g. , statistics in general (De La Hoz Ruiz & Hijon Neira 2023). Not only they incorporate educational content but also convey the educator’s pedagogical and moral messages, delivering them to learners through an entertaining format (Dankov & Dankova 2023). Educational video games are proven to be effective tool not only for basic school education, but also in case of specific topics regarding various aspects of life, including disaster risk management (Caroca et al. 2019) or tapeworm prevention (Trevisan et al. 2023).

An effective approach to supporting students’ scientific understanding involves integrating video games with hands-on activities, where each activity informs and enhances the other (Trindade et al. 2019). Also, games are more effective in shaping intended behavior when they do not focus on narrow aspects of the subject (Underhay et al. 2016). The educational video games created by teachers are highly effective in enhancing knowledge acquisition and motivation in both face-to-face and online settings (Lopez-Fernandez et al. 2023). Moreover, game-based learning through educational video games is a practical and effective method for training teachers as well (Gordillo et al. 2021).

Few studies have focused on learners with special needs. Educational video games may serve as an effective tool for improving speech skills of adolescents with Down Syndrome (González-Ferreras et al. 2017). Playing educational video games makes learning more enjoyable and engaging for children with ADHD, enhancing their study skills and knowledge acquisition (Rebollo et al. 2024). Incorporating randomness into educational engineering video games can help autistic children engage with unpredictability and enhance their cognitive behaviors. Significant improvements are observed in their attention span, memory, response to random processes, and ability to manage parallel information (Al-Hammadi & Abdelazim 2015).

Game design

The way educational video games are designed affects the learners’ and teachers’ experience, as well as games’ effectiveness. For example game-embedded animations as learning support are more effective than in case of the same game without support, yet they do not affect players’ enjoyment (Bainbridge et al. 2022). Researchers call for games that immerse players in exploring and experimenting with personally meaningful questions related to domain-specific representations (Holbert & Wilensky 2019) or even create new frameworks for design of educational video games (Legerén Lago 2017). Writers of the story and designers of the game must create an interactive narrative that remains engaging and high-quality regardless of the player’s decisions (López-Arcos et al. 2016). Designers are advised to incorporate a variety of game modes during development, as learners often engage with multiple modes. Additionally, gameplay sessions should be limited to no more than one hour (Khouna et al. 2020). Analyzing motivational factors of educational video games, Chen et al. (2024) prepared following recommendations for game designers: “(1) provide clear and straightforward tutorial instructions, (2) make the game more intuitive to understand, and (3) reduce the repetitive elements of the game”.

Postulates like these are constructed on the basis of players’ and teachers’ experiences and opinions (collected in experiments, surveys or interviews), but omitting the game developers’ perspective.

Method

History of ethnography shows different approaches to what self- or autoethnography is (Reed-Danahay 2020). Following the assumption that “auto-ethnographies can be and are written by scholars with many diverse interests and backgrounds” (Hayano 1979, 100), and that ethnographic self can be the only informant involved (Collins & Gallinat 2010) in this article I apply first-person narrative told by a commoner (Brandes 1979).  In this approach, the method is used for understanding human actions and concerns (Roth 2009). Self-ethnography invokes an imbrication of history and memory (Russel 1999). Further in the text I present my perspective on edutainment.

The mechanics-dynamics-aesthetics (MDA) framework for game research (Hunicke et al. 2004) may also be applied to studies on game development (Flamma & Para 2023). Mechanics, dynamics and aesthetics are terms I use in my analysis, therefore it might be helpful to explain them for an uninitiated reader. The algorithmic structure of a game, along with its rules and foundational systems, is referred to as the game’s mechanics. The interaction with a game’s mechanics gives rise to behaviors that emerge during gameplay, which are referred to as dynamics. Aesthetics refers to the emotional responses and experiences that players have while interacting with the game (Hunicke et al. 2004; Flamma & Para 2023).

Author’s experience in educational game design

My game design experiences are quite varied. On the one hand, the VR experience, which is intended to simulate decision-making and the effects of decisions as faithfully as possible, and teaching how to perform the so-called protocol, i.e. a checklist of activities in a specific order to perform a given task well.  For example  driving vehicles on a logistics site, conducting job interviews or designing warehouse space in accordance with Polish rack load standards.

The second type of experience involves the development of a language application specifically designed for teaching English, tailored to meet the needs of a public university. This application was crafted to serve as an educational tool for students, helping them navigate communication within an intercultural group. It focused not only on language acquisition but also on teaching the essential social skills required for effective interaction in diverse environments. The application included lessons on campus etiquette, addressing the nuances of academic and social behavior in a university setting. Furthermore, it emphasized the most important rules for engaging in respectful and effective communication, preparing students to interact confidently and appropriately with peers from various cultural backgrounds. By integrating both linguistic and cultural aspects, the application aimed to provide a well-rounded educational experience, fostering both language proficiency and cultural awareness among students. This comprehensive approach ensured that users were equipped with the necessary skills to thrive in an international academic environment.

Last but not least, I worked on [game title anonymized], where our goal was to introduce the poet and his fate and to show characteristic elements of the cities  he lived in. Here, the goal was to remember images and facts, but the most important goal was to show the specificity of the poet’s work and their atmosphere through graphics, lighting, and horror. We chose the visual novel form because we had serious concerns that focusing the game on gameplay would not cause the memorization of insignificant details, and the overall educational outline would be lost. The concerns were quite real, because we wanted to teach something related to visual memory (elements of cities) and impressions and their character (romanticism and its characteristics). Gameplay could focus players excessively on facts or details that were a less important part of the entire educational path.

Game Developer’s Perspective

Preproduction

How does entertainmentization of education affect the process of game development? In case of educational games, each title has its own educational purposes defined in advance. At the preproduction stage, game developers have to apply educational principles in game environment, mechanics and core loop, and at the same time design the learning path. 

Various methods can be employed depending on the specific goals that need to be achieved. Each objective may require a unique approach, tailored to address the desired outcomes effectively. In the context of game design, this often involves carefully selecting techniques that align with the intended purpose, whether it’s fostering problem-solving skills, encouraging collaboration, or promoting individual creativity.

Designing game mechanics involves crafting them in a way that ensures they are clear and intuitive for the player to understand. It is important that these mechanics actively support the player’s learning process, making it easier for them to grasp concepts through memorization and repetition. By reinforcing these elements, players can naturally internalize the rules and strategies of the game as they continue to engage with it. Additionally, well-designed mechanics should spark curiosity, encouraging players to explore and experiment within the game world. This sense of discovery can keep players motivated and invested in the experience. Furthermore, the mechanics should provide a tangible sense of progress, allowing players to feel a sense of accomplishment and growth as they overcome challenges. Altogether, these aspects work together to create a cohesive and engaging gaming experience that is both rewarding and enjoyable.

The game developer is also responsible for designing the core loop, gameplay loops, or looping and repeating mechanics in such a way that the player acquires knowledge, repeats it and executes it in the form of completing tasks in the game. At the same time, the appropriate flow of the game must be maintained. The appropriate level of flow guarantees the level of concentration and in games that are, for example, for humanities subjects, where you have to remember a lot of knowledge, and not necessarily understand it, it can help by arousing curiosity. In turn, STEM subjects are based more on the use of knowledge in practice and action-reaction learning, which is easier in games, because knowledge used in practice contributes to the player’s progress, and this is the basis of satisfaction.

Another issue on the border between education and entertainment, which is the responsibility of a game developer, is creating an appropriate learning path. When creating an educational game, the developer actually creates a learning path, because the entire gameplay and interaction with the software is to support the process of effective learning. It is exactly the same in the case of casual games, where the player must first be taught, for example, in the form of a tutorial or prologue, the mechanics, their application and the rules of the game world. Educational games are not only games aimed at children and young people, but also at adults preparing for specific professions. In games testing manual skills, e.g. VR welding or VR logistics site, or other games supporting vocational education, the aim is also to teach good preparatory practices for performing a given activity, e.g., taking care of equipment, safety, shaping appropriate attitudes, etc.

Production

At the production stage, the need to combine entertainment and educational goals results in continuous testing of implemented solutions. This is the stage of checking to what extent the method and form of implementation and selected means stimulate concentration are presented clearly, appropriately and understandably to the indicated group of recipients. The regular testing process supports iterative design, where the production of the game is based on regular iterations, which are the result of analysis and testing of the game by professional testers and at a later stage by blind tests of players representing the target audience groups.

Creating educational games presents a significant challenge, particularly when it comes to the production process. One of the primary difficulties lies in ensuring that the tools and methods employed are not only effective but also do not inadvertently distract players from their learning objectives. It requires constant evaluation to confirm that these tools support the educational goals rather than disrupt or destabilize the intended learning path. For instance, flashy visuals or overly complex mechanics might draw attention away from the core material, making it harder for players to focus on the educational content.

At the same time, it is equally important to design elements that actively enhance the learning experience. This involves incorporating features that stimulate cognitive engagement, such as interactive challenges, problem-solving tasks, or feedback systems that encourage players to reflect on their progress. By doing so, the game can maintain its educational purpose while also fostering curiosity and motivation.

Furthermore, despite the emphasis on learning, the game must still be visually appealing and mechanically engaging to the player. Striking a balance between educational value and entertainment is no small feat, as both aspects need to work in harmony to create an enjoyable yet meaningful experience. Developers must carefully consider the visual design, gameplay mechanics, and overall user experience to ensure the final product is both captivating and effective in achieving its educational objectives.

Launch

At the stage of launch and game support, the MDA [mechanics-dynamics-aesthetics] structure is implemented in a real and practical way, where a) player feedback, b) actual player behavior in the game environment, and c) connected analytics (e.g. Google Analytics systems and statistics of distribution platforms regarding game time or other systems for collecting information about player behavior) indicate what developers did effectively and what not.

This is where the significant challenge arises as feedback from players plays a crucial role in refining and enhancing the game. The purpose of this feedback is to help improve the game’s overall design, ensuring it supports the educational objectives and maximizes its potential to achieve its most important learning goals. Player feedback can provide valuable insights into aspects that are working well and those that need adjustment. However, there is a critical distinction to be made: for the player, the game is still primarily a form of entertainment, and their responses may reflect their desire for more engaging or enjoyable features, rather than those that serve the educational purpose. This can lead to the point where the feedback, while valuable from an entertainment perspective, could actually suggest changes that would detract from the game’s educational focus. For instance, players might suggest adding more visually stimulating elements or increasing the complexity of certain mechanics, which could inadvertently create distractions from the core learning objectives. These types of changes might seem appealing from the player’s point of view but could undermine the game’s ability to effectively stimulate memory, reinforce concepts, and develop essential skills. Therefore, it’s important to carefully analyze player feedback to ensure that any adjustments made do not compromise the educational integrity of the game.

Conclusion

This article sheds light on the overlooked perspective of game designers in the field of edutainment. The systematic literature review revealed a predominant focus on learners, teachers, game effectiveness, and game design, with little to no attention given to the voices of game designers themselves. This gap in the research overlooks the unique challenges and insights designers face throughout the development process.

To address this, a self-ethnographic study was conducted, offering a first-hand account of the tensions encountered during three critical stages of game development: preproduction, production, and launch. By exploring these phases, the study highlights the complexities of balancing educational objectives, entertainment value, and practical constraints, providing a nuanced understanding of the development process.

This work emphasizes the need for future research to include game designers as active contributors, through interviews or collaborative studies, to foster a more holistic understanding of edutainment. Bridging this gap can lead to more effective and innovative educational games that meet the needs of both educators and learners while addressing the practical realities of game development.

References

All links verified 16.9.2025.

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Latin America, war memes, political memes, social media, Ukraine war

Samantha Martinez Ziegler
samazin [a] utu.fi
Doctoral Researcher
Digital Culture, Landscape and Cultural Heritage
University of Turku

How to cite: Martinez Ziegler, Samantha. 2025. “TerceraGuerraMundial in Memes: Latin American Perspectives on the Russo-Ukrainian War”. WiderScreen 28 (1–2). https://widerscreen.fi/numerot/1-2-2025-widerscreen-28-numerot/terceraguerramundial-in-memes-latin-american-perspectives-on-the-russo-ukrainian-war-2/

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has seen the use of war memes on social media as tools to engage in political discussion, spread ideologies, and as visual propaganda, particularly in anglophone cyberspaces and with an Eurocentric standpoint. In Latin America, where memetic culture is distinctly rooted in humour, emotions, and irony, Ukraine war memes have been used to express social and political commentary on the conflict. These war memes reveal affective responses to the Russia-Ukraine war, and present different perspectives on the effects of the war. The focus of this paper is the Latin American perspectives on the Russia-Ukraine war conveyed through memes created and posted on the day of the invasion under the hashtag Tercera Guerra Mundial (Third World War). By examining ten Spanish-language memes, I establish three common responses and stances, and explain the context in which they are conceived. This text was originally written for the 2024 course on Media Criticism and Society as part of the Dark Play project in the Digital Culture, Cultural Heritage and Landscape program at the University of Turku, and was revisited and last modified in the autumn of 2024.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, memes have been used as political and social commentary for years. From criticism and mockery aimed at specific political figures and parties, to bringing awareness to social issues that affect society, memes are today a common tool of Latin American political agendas (Makhortykh & González Aguilar 2020, 342). While this commentary sometimes focuses on local incidents and political figures that are relevant within specific geographical boundaries, as it can be commonly observed in memes that highlight the ongoing social unrest in countries like Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, among others, other instances also show how memes are used to engage in political discourse that extends beyond the region, like international geopolitical issues. In this sense, the Latino memetic culture on social media is built upon the communicative power established between individuals that can observe reality from a particular perspective, thus allowing for collective commentary on foreign socio-political issues (Vera Campillay 2016, 6).

From a personal standpoint, I have been part of Twitterzuela (Graterol 2021), an online community of Venezuelan X^[1] users, since 2009. My experience as a member of this digital community has given me the opportunity to witness the evolution and production of political memes first-hand. A good example of the popularity of political memes in Twitterzuela is the creation of memes to celebrate the death of former president and controversial politician Hugo Chávez. Since 2013, the hashtag #ChavezPartyNightClub has been used on X every March 5th to share hundreds of memes, usually through a mix of image macros, text, and video clips (Maduradas 2021). Many of these memes are recycled and reposted each year, although it is common for new posts in the form of image macros or videos to be shared as well.

The memetic culture found in Twitterzuela is, though, part of a much larger culture that is shared with other Spanish-speaking countries in the region. For instance, in Mexico, memes became an effective campaign weapon employed by political parties and their followers during the 2018 presidential elections (Franco Estrada & Rawnsley 2021, 334). Latino abortion rights activists created and shared political memes during massive online protests on social media platforms like X and Instagram under the hashtag #AbortoLegalYa (Legal abortion now) since the late 2010s onwards (Acosta 2020, 40). In this manner, with over 400 million native Spanish speakers living across 20 countries (Osoblivaia 2020), Latin America has developed their own way of creating, replicating, adopting, and sharing memes through the years. The semantics of the Spanish language allow for visual and textual imagery to travel across these countries, despite the slight differences in regional dialects and area-specific internet jargon.

Bueno Oliviera (2022, 178) expands on this by explaining that the cultural characteristics of the Latino memes are not always understood by foreign individuals, and vice versa. In regard to political memes directed towards foreign conflicts and/or events, the digital boundaries between the Latin American countries begin to blur. Instead of 20 countries, the region becomes one geographical entity, a spectator isolated from the rest of the world where the conflict takes place (Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico 2023, 23). This has been the case in respect to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war following the Russia invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (ibid). The Ukraine war memes created and shared in Spanish spaces on social media do not stay in country-specific bubbles; rather, these memes are intended to express collective thoughts, ideas, and sentiments of Latin America, whether explicitly or implicitly, in their content. This is reflected by the use of visual and textual elements (e.g., including the map and/or flags of Latin American countries, or including the word Latinoamérica or Latam in the memes) to talk about “us” in relation to “them/it” (in this instance, the war).

On social media, particularly on the platform X, the use of the hashtag #TerceraGuerraMundial (Third World War) to post memes about the Russo-Ukraine war particularly stands out. The hashtag is a hyperbole, where Latinos interpret contemporary foreign conflicts and crises of international interest and reach as an “unofficial” Third World War. Along these lines, #TerceraGuerraMundial has been used sporadically since 2020 by Latinos to share political memes, especially whenever international tensions arise. For example, the January 2020 Iranian attack on US forces (Harkins 2021) generated a lot of reactionary memes in Latin American spaces, which were shared through this hashtag on X (see Fig. 1). Although the fear of conflict factors in the creation of political memes (Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico 2023, 3), the use of #TerceraGuerraMundial also hints at an alarmist reaction before international political unrest.

Today, #TerceraGuerraMundial has become particularly relevant to discuss the Russia-Ukraine war in Latino cyberspaces (Quintanilla Kanter 2022). This paper discusses Latin American perspectives on the Russian invasion of Ukraine based on the textual and visual contents of war memes. In particular, I am interested in examining the earliest memetic responses to the conflict in Ukraine. From this perspective, I ponder the following: what kind of social commentary on the Russia-Ukraine war do Latinos express through memes on social media? Which particular emotions, ideas, and stances are reflected in the content of these war memes? What are the characteristics of Latino meme culture on the social media platform X? Towards this goal, I collected a small sample of 10 Spanish memes that were published shortly after the Russia invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 on X. The sample was then split into three categories based on the ideational components of its contents, which in turn offer three typical frames of reference on the conflict.

War Memes: Political Weapons of the Digital Age

The term “meme” was first used by biologist Richard Dawkins in 1976 to talk about units of culture that are transmitted from person to person, usually by imitation (Shifman 2014, 2). This definition has served as the base upon which academics have further developed the concept of meme. Particularly, in regard to internet memetics, professor Limor Shifman departs from Dawkins’ original definition proposes that instead of viewing memes as singular units of culture, they should be viewed as groups of units with common features, formats, and themes that can be replicated and imitated (Vainikka 2016, 61). Although the term is used colloquially to talk about fast-spread humorous images, videos, texts, among other media that is copied and replicated by others on the internet, academics offer a more ample understanding of what they are, what they represent, and how to interpret their content.

For example, Makhortykh & González Aguilar (2020, 343) describe memes as a combination of visual and verbal elements that aim to “stir affective reactions.” This echoes earlier statements by Nissenbaum and Shifman (2018, 297), which hold that “emotions are central to the operation of memes.” As another way of putting it, memes are carriers of an affective power. In this vein, Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico (2023, 6) support these claims by defining memes as messages transmitted through repetition and emotions, anchored to the perception of a particular reality.

While internet memes can be used to convey positivity (e.g., celebrate success, enhance positive feelings, and show empathy), they can also be tools to spread misinformation, hate speech, and political propaganda (Vainikka 2016, 63; Nissenbaum & Shifman 2018, 297). Internet memes have played a particular role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, being used by both of the parties involved to promote their respective political agendas on social media. Pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia have been used by both civilians and government officials since the conflict started to engage in political discourse (Saarikoski et al. 2024, 7). In fact, a cartoon depicting Adolf Hitler caressing Russian president Vladimir Putin’s cheek, captioned “This is not a ‘meme’, but our and your reality right now” posted by the Ukraine government’s official X account hours after Putin announced the start of a “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is one of the first official uses of political memes in this particular armed conflict (Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico 2023, 7).

In a recent study, Chen et al. (2023) analysed the content of pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine war memes and were able to place them in different categories according to their contextual usage to convey political messages. Their findings indicate that the thematic of pro-Russian memes often emphasise the high competence of the Russian government while showcasing the incompetence of the enemies, i.e., “targeting aspects of US and their allies’ culture and beliefs” (Chen et al. 2023, 42). Meanwhile, the study allocates pro-Ukraine memes into three different categories: Russian deceit, Russian incompetence, and Ukrainian fortitude (Chen et al. 2023, 45). These findings establish similar patterns in the use of war memes by both of the belligerent parties, particularly as digital weapons to undermine the enemy (especially in the case of pro-Russian memes), as well as praising their fellow countrymen, military forces, and government.

Although acknowledging the weaponization of political memes in digital spaces is vital when discussing ideologies, movements, and modern conflicts as the war in Ukraine, it is important to note that memes have had other uses as well. For instance, Saarikoski et al. (2024, 6) explain that beyond political agendas, memes have been used to express emotions caused by the war, particularly in regard to coping with emotional trauma. In other words, memes can offer cathartic psychological relief to those negatively affected by the war. Nissenbaum & Shifman (2018, 297) have previously explained the emotional nature of the internet meme, and have suggested that these emotions are co-constructed at both individual and collective levels. In this sense, although memes can reflect individualistic emotions (e.g., someone’s personal fears and anxieties about the war), their relatability and virality further indicate that these emotions are felt collectively as well.

The aforementioned studies on the use of memes in the Russo-Ukrainian war also suggest that part of the conflict is carried out on social media as well (Saarikoski et al. 2024, 5). In this context, social media platforms are not only used to comment on the conflict, but as digital spaces where to use memetic warfare (ibid.). That is to say, the effects of the war are felt in geographical locations as well as in cyberspace. Nonetheless, the war memes analysed in these studies offer insights into (Western) European and Russian perspectives and do not encompass the entire landscape of Ukraine war memes shared online. Consequently, other foreign outlooks and stances are largely absent from their findings.

As noted earlier, the creation and sharing of Spanish-language war memes from a Latin American viewpoint has prevailed on social media from February 24, 2022, onwards. Discussing the memetic practices of Spanish speakers in Latin America, Bueno Olivera (2020, 180-181) highlights the use of humorous memes as political expressions and in the face of crises and disasters. Humour is one of the biggest characteristics of the Spanish-speaking internet, influencing the perception and creation of realities in the region.^[2] A recent study on the Latin American representation of the Russo-Ukrainian by Xavier Alejandro Gómez-Muñoz & Hilda Paola Muñoz-Pico (2023, 22) show that the memetic culture in the region heavily relies on humour and affective emotions rather than on logic. The authors focused on the rhetoric analysis of the most popular Ukraine war memes found on X at the time of their writing, as determined by the number of likes in a post. Furthermore, this research also found two predominant themes in Spanish memes: the celebration of Latin American integration (positive emotion) and an apathetic stance towards the war (self-awareness, and often negative emotions), both expressed through humour (Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico 2023, 23).

Following their perspective, the memes discussed below illustrate these types of responses to conflict in the context of Latin American memetic culture. While the study by Gómez-Muñoz and Muñoz-Pico chose to approach the topic by using a sample size of 10 X posts based on popularity, my sample was selected in terms of: immediacy (memes that were posted on the same day or the day after the invasion was announced) and hashtag usage (must include the hashtag #TerceraGuerraMundial).

Integration: “Today is a good day to be from Latin America”

The meme above shows a template of Jotchua, a golden retriever puppy held up in one hand towards the camera, next to a map of Latin America and the Caribbean, with added text above reading “I love you,” in regard to the region (see Fig. 3). This meme, also known as Perro Dinero (Money Dog), has been used by Spanish speakers on social media, particularly on X, to express thankfulness. The superimposed text reading “I love you” above the puppy’s shabby and pixelated appearance often indicates a feeling best described as a “pained” relief. For instance, this meme became very popular during the Olympic games to show support for athletes and teams, especially in cases where the possibilities of winning were minimal (Gómez-Muñoz & Muñoz-Pico 2023, 19).

This meme reflects the sentiments of Latin American integration from a cultural and geographical standpoint, and isolation (from the rest of the world) that were previously discussed. The humour here is subtle but simple: the war is happening in Europe, not in Latin America, and therefore, positive feelings towards living in Latin America are expressed. Although the war in Ukraine has affected the region in terms of lower economic growth and high inflation even a few months after the war began (UN 2022), the positive emotion here is reflected in the lack of proximity to the armed conflict.

The juxtaposition of the meme and its caption versus the hashtags used are also worth pointing out; while the visual and textual imagery show love towards Latin America, the use of warning hashtags like #ATENCIÓN #AHORA (#ATTENTION #NOW), in addition to the more alarmist #ThirdWorldWar creates a contrast in the message delivered by the meme. At the same time, the hashtags are used to give further background on the meme. If we were to view these memes by themselves, without knowing that they were posted in regard to the Russo-Ukrainian war, the meaning would surely be lost. This demonstrates what Milner (2013, 2365) has defined as “minimalistic humour,” a characteristic of memes in which further context is needed to understand its humour and textual content.

In the collected sample, I found several examples of memes that convey a strong collective feeling of Latin American integration, despite experienced hardships and socio-cultural issues found in the region (see Figs. 4-6). Simultaneously, other characteristics of the memetic culture in Latin America arose. For instance, in a study comparing the use of political memes in Venezuela and Ukraine, Makhortykh & González Aguilar (2020) point out that Venezuelan memes reference popular culture products, such as Western popular culture and anime/manga (349). The figures above illustrate how image macros of the American animated series SpongeBob SquarePants and the Nintendo video games character Kirby have been used to express feelings of love towards Latin America by Latinos (see Figs. 5-6).

A critical approach one could implement when studying these types of memes is the lack of empathy and insensitivity towards the effects of the war (namely casualties, injuries, tragedy). While the message of these memes is not meant to be mock the conflict, and rather showcases a newfound sense of unity in the region, there is still the lingering question of whether it is ethical to “celebrate” not being involved in a war, especially by using alarmist hashtags like #ATTENTION and the more visible #ThirdWarWorld to spread these memes.

Apathy: “That’s my secret, Europe, I’m always in crisis”

This second type of meme showcases a playful take on the region’s apathy in situations of international crisis or disasters. In the particular meme above, a figureless representation of Europe asks, “Latin America, why are you not in crisis due to the #ThirdWorldWar?” In this context, the hashtag is used to replace the name of the actual conflict, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The meme shows a reconfiguration of the original line delivered by the Hulk in Marvel’s 2012 film the Avengers: “that’s my secret, Captain. I’m always angry” becomes “that’s my secret, Europe. I’m always in crisis,” and in this stance, Latin America is embodied by the Hulk (see Fig. 7).

Apathy is best defined as a human behaviour that reflects absence or suppression of empathy, emotion, or interest. I mentioned earlier that humorous memes are used to cope with the trauma generated by the war. At the same time, pessimistic and parodic humour can be employed as a coping mechanism for other political stresses and insecurities (Makhortykh & González Aguilar 2020, 352). In the case of Latin America, the region has been afflicted by socioeconomic crises for decades, many of which have been heightened by several military dictatorships from the 19th century onwards, leaving millions living in poverty. For instance, a study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2023) shows that “more than 180 million people in the region do not have enough income to meet their basic needs and 70 million of them lack the income needed to acquire a basic food basket.” My home country of Venezuela has seen an inflation rate of over 60.000% in the past years (Statista 2020), while its capital city, Caracas, is ranked third in the world’s most violent cities (World Population Review, n.d.). The top ten is composed of Latin American cities.

With this in mind, it is easier to put the apathy expressed through these memes in a wider geopolitical and social context. Seiffert et al. (2018, 2863) consider that, while memes can be used as political commentary, they can move from their original political expression “toward humour, irreverence, and meaninglessness.” In the case of these memes, while they are originally intended to show lack of interest in the Russo-Ukrainian war and further the feelings of isolation previously described by Gómez-Muñoz and Muñoz-Pico (2023), they can also be viewed as a collective introspection. In other words, Latin Americans look at their own experiences living in the region, they review the negative side of it (i.e., the socio-economic crises, economic collapses, dictatorships, corruption, ongoing violence, etc), and acknowledge them through humour.

That said, the content of these memes can also be examined through more critical lenses. For instance, in the examples shown in Figs. 8-9, both images indicate that Spanish speakers are aware of the war and the tragedy it brings, but they choose not to take a side or express any empathy towards any of the belligerent parties. In the first meme (Fig. 8), the anthropomorphic skeleton glances at the nuclear explosion happening at its back, yet chooses to look away and carry on the conversation, strengthening the feeling of Latin American integration that was described in the previous chapter. Ironically, or perhaps intentionally, the comic strip that serves as a template for this meme is taken from the cover of Peace Sells… but Who’s Buying? (1986), an album by American thrash metal band Megadeth.

Alternatively, the next sample meme (Fig. 9) shows a combination of a visual component (an image of a golden retriever dog sitting in front of a laptop while the background behind it depicts a catastrophic war scenario) and a textual component (the post caption, indicating that a benefit from living in a “third world country,” namely a developing country, is not to be affected by the war). The dog’s breed (golden retriever) and demeanour (its mouth open and relaxed, with the tongue hanging out) can represent happiness, while the war at its back represents the Ukraine war. The dog’s paws are on the laptop, thus showing that it must carry on its activities, in spite of the conflict.

It is worth nothing that these memes were posted on the day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Over two years afterwards, we have witnessed the rampant tragedy, death and destruction brought by the war. The dark and borderline prophetic nature of these memes must then be questioned. Is apathy visible in these memes still “justifiable,” when there is an implicit level of consciousness of the possible consequences of the Ukraine war? Can we infer that apathy equals acceptance, when this reality had not yet come to fruition? Or rather, should this apathy be interpreted as a form of complacency?

Fear and Self-Awareness: “No. Next question.”

Lastly, this last example shows a dialogue in Spanish followed by an image of the character Amy Fowler from the American sitcom the Big Bang Theory (2007–2019). As has been the case with previous examples, the dialogue in this meme is between a foreign figure (“other countries”) and Latin America as one entity. The foreign figure addresses the influx of Spanish memes and jokes being created about the war, and acknowledges the unspoken and widespread feelings of dread caused by the conflict. In return, Latin America’s response is that of Amy Fowler. In the image, the character is being pushed for questions by reporters, and carries a blank expression as the caption “No. Next question,” indicates a rather blunt, direct answer.

In a recent study of the depiction of fear in memes related to the COVID-19 pandemic, Damatis (2024, 41) determined that emotions are commonly represented by a combination of verbal and visual elements. Namely, the mix of pictures and text let the reader understand the emotion behind its creation. The representation of fear present in the Spanish-language sample are not dissimilar; it is the combination of text and images that gives meaning to the memes at an emotional level. And even more so, the memes used as example here show a level of self-awareness and introspection in regard to this fear; Latinos acknowledge the fear of war and conflict, even if it is happening in another continent, and credit it as the driving force behind the creation of war memes. Yet, at the same time, the dialogue shown in Fig. 10 points that despite their self-awareness, Latinos refuse to stop using memes to cope and “take it seriously.” 

Earlier in the text, I referenced research of Saarikoski et al. (2024, 6-7), who argue that memes become a momentary relief to cope with traumatic experiences in the case of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Along these lines, Gómez-Muñoz and Muñoz-Pico (2023, 23) also observed in their study of Spanish-language memes that fear was the most predominant emotion present in their sample. More specifically, their findings establish that this fear is rooted in being forced to be involved in the war, and not on the overall effects of the war at a global scale (ibid.). With this in mind, we must once again think of the ethics of war memes. Is it right to share memes that either celebrate the isolation of the continent or that turn a blind eye to the war, when the same are masking the fear of being forced into taking part in it through humour?

Latinos seem to be aware of the moral dilemmas associated with war memes, as reflected in the figures shown in this section. In this regard, the main question seems to be “why post memes about the war, given how serious the issue is?” Each of the memes selected offer a different stance: the first meme shows avoidance and bluntness (see Fig. 10). The second meme shows the duality of the Latino memetic culture, highlighting the affinity for humour even when facing moments of distress (see Fig. 11). Lastly, the third meme shows a similar lack of interest and empathy as described in the previous chapter; the comic strip shows the map of Latin America personified by the character Homer Simpson, who not only acknowledges it is not right to “joke” about serious topics, but seconds the sentiment with apathy by stating that “that’s just how things are” (see Fig. 12) The implication here is subtle but strong: this is how the memetic culture in the region is, and Latinos are not willing to compromise nor change it.

Conclusion

Global events of international importance inspire the creation of memes. In today’s time and age, memes have gained a purpose beyond humour and/or entertainment, becoming vehicles through which to engage in social and political discourse. Through satire and comedy, memes can be used to quickly spread opinions, thoughts, and ideas with the intention to praise, criticise, or simply offer commentary on socio-political problems, figures, and environments. Along these lines, the creation of memes does not occur in a vacuum; external factors, particularly social and cultural ones, influence the textual and visual components of the meme, and the overall message it conveys.

Through the years, Latin America has developed its own memetic culture in the digital world. This culture is very much headlined by a distinct, and oftentimes unapologetic sense of humour, which itself reflects the vibrant and jokey nature of Latinos. In this regard, Spanish-language memes are used to express collective stances and remarks on current and political issues, as has been the case with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. On February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion of Ukraine, Latinos turned to the social media platform X to engage in political discourse by sharing memes with the hashtag #TerceraGuerraMundial. Translating to Third World War in English, the hashtag carries a heavy and rather alarmist connotation: this war will become a global conflict.

Although the full effects of the Ukraine war and its impact on the global economic, geopolitics, cost-of-living were yet to erupt as we have now witnessed in the past couple of years, these memes reflect a collectivistic and immediate response to the possibility of an upcoming global conflict. As is the case with the memetic culture of Latin America, humour and satire have been used to express collective feelings, and in particular, positive and negative emotions.

The collected sample shows that a portion of the Spanish-language memes focused on highlighting the geographical separation between Latin America and Ukraine, where the conflict is taking place. In doing so, memes are used to create a feeling of integration in the region. This is reflected in the “happy” textual and visual components of the memes (i.e., the use of images where hearts and smiling characters are visible, the bold text reading “I love you” above the Latin America map). Yet, while these emotions are positive from a Latin America perspective, they can be interpreted as insensitive or rude in view of a real war that has had appalling consequences.

Thus and thus, apathy and fear were the two prevalent negative emotions found in the sample. As I mentioned, the creation of memes does not happen in a vacuum; the apathy that is shown in these memes can be attributed to the socioeconomic and political challenges and inequalities that have impacted the lives of millions of people living in Latin America. Namely, when daily life is a struggle, poverty is all around, and violence is rampant, a conflict taking place thousands of kilometres away does not feel as impactful as the realities Latinos face on their day-to-day. Yet, interestingly so, these Ukraine war memes also show a level of introspection, as Latinos use them to express their fear of the possibility of a Third World War. More specifically, of their forced participation in a global armed conflict. In this case, apathy and fear shall not be viewed as a juxtaposition; rather, this fear is closely related to the emergent problems found in the region. If life in Latin America can be very difficult, any additional threats, such as being forced to take part in a World War, can seem extremely frightening.

Whether positive or negative, the sample demonstrates how war memes are used to cope with the stress and anxieties of an emerging conflict, and shines the spotlight on Latin American perspectives of the war. The matter of whether or not certain stances and employed humour are insensitive or dark must be approached carefully, and it is of great importance to put things in the right context prior to making meanings of them. Viewing things from a critical perspective not only lets us have a better understanding of digital phenomena and human behaviour, but also to question them and the reasons behind them. I believe that some of the questions raised by the examples discussed in this paper, as well as evoked in the reader, could be answered by examining the evolution of these Spanish-language war memes from February 2022 until today. Moreover, a comparative study might indicate whether the stances have changed with the evolution of the conflict.

References

All links verified 18.12.2024. 

Research Material

🍄✨ Pøly_shitpøster✨🍄 (@ShippaiG). 2022. “Y decían que vivir en un país tercermundista no traía beneficios #TerceraGuerraMundial #URGENTE.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 7:53 AM. https://x.com/ShippaiG/status/1496724943601639427.

Alex (@alexculee). 2022. “Europa: Latinoamérica por qué no entras en crisis por #TerceraGuerraMundial ? Latam: ese es mi secreto Europa, siempre estoy en crisis.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 8:29 PM. https://x.com/alexculee/status/1496915131334377473.

Bonnie🦋 (@Bonnie_chan05). 2022. “Yo antes: sAQUENME DE LATINOAMERICA Yo ahora: viendo la tendencia -Putin, corea del norte, Estados unidos, Rusia, china, Ucrania, Guerra, etc- No gracias, acá toy bien #TerceraGuerraMundial” X, Feb 24, 2022, 10:15 PM. https://x.com/Bonnie_chan05/status/1496941865916153860.

GabyLR🌌🛸🐙🐋🌎☄️🌕 (@GabyLR15). 2022. “Los demás países: Latinoamérica puedes dejar de hacer memes para ocultar tu miedo y tomarte esto enserio? Latinoamérica #TerceraGuerraMundial” X, Feb 24, 2022, 2:35 PM. https://x.com/GabyLR15/status/1496826082821132290.

Luisa (@Luimv96). 2022. “Todos preocupados por la tercera guerra mundial pero aún así entrando a twitter a ver los momazos: #TerceraGuerraMundial.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 6:20 AM. https://x.com/Luimv96/status/1496701433093271552. 

Licenciado Yagami (@NegritoTuiter0). 2022. “Ya no me saquen de Latinoamérica banda… 🥲 #Rusia LATAM #Ucrania #Ucraina #Putin #TerceraGuerraMundial.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 5:36 PM. https://x.com/NegritoTuiter0/status/1496871671516565504.

navas, misael (@misael_666). 2020. “Trump: ”latinoamerica esta de lado de eeuu” Latinoamérica: #WWIII #TerceraGuerraMundial #worldwar3” X, Jan 4, 2020, 5:18 AM. https://x.com/misael_666/status/1213298625683578881.

Perez, Francisco (@Olympus_Mons96). 2022. “#TerceraGuerraMundial #Anonymous *Rusia, Estados Unidos y Ucrania en plena guerra* Todos en el conflicto … LATAM:” X, Feb 25, 2022, 7:46 PM.https://x.com/Olympus_Mons96/status/1497266128804061188/. 

Richie (@GranRichiee). 2022. “Es un buen día para ser de LATAM #Ucrania #Ukraine #ATENCION #AHORA #TerceraGuerraMundial.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 3:18 PM. https://x.com/GranRichiee/status/1496836943866441730.

Ukraine / Україна (@Ukraine). 2022. “This is not a ‘meme’, but our and your reality right now.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 10:43 AM. https://x.com/Ukraine/status/1496767831182041089.

Wen🇦🇷🏆⭐⭐⭐ (@wensugg). 2022. “*Yo hasta ayer queriendo irme del país y de LATAM* Yo hoy: #TerceraGuerraMundial #WWIII.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 1:46 PM. https://x.com/wensugg/status/1496813852796747776.

Zeceña, Marlon (@marlonzece). 2022. “Donde están los estudiantes de la UVG que querían salir de Latinoamérica. #TerceraGuerraMundial #WWIII.” X, Feb 24, 2022, 10:50 PM. https://x.com/marlonzece/status/1496952850219511808.

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Notes

^[1] Formerly known as Twitter; hence the portmanteau “Twitterzuela.”

^[2] For further information, see Internet, Humor, and Nation in Latin America (2024), edited by Héctor Fernández L’Hoeste and Juan Poblete.

Drag panic, moral panic, disinformation, lgbtq discrimination, lgbtq rights

Samantha Martinez Ziegler
samazin [a] utu.fi
Doctoral Researcher
Digital Culture, Landscape and Cultural Heritage
University of Turku

How to cite: Martinez Ziegler, Samantha. 2025. ”Hate Is a Drag — Examining the Drag Panic of the 2020s”. WiderScreen 28 (1–2). https://widerscreen.fi/numerot/1-2-2025-widerscreen-28-numerot/hate-is-a-drag-examining-the-drag-panic-of-the-2020s/

Printable PDF-version

Moral panics are built on the disproportional fear of a group of people, things, or behaviours that are falsely perceived to threaten values and norms of society. This irrational fear is fuelled by disinformation and far-reaching narratives that seek to spread panic and call for the hostile and imminent rejection of said “folk devil.” In the 2020s, a sudden drag panic has been spreading worldwide, driven by conservative activists and targeting Drag Story Hour events. By adopting anti-gay narratives and pervasive rhetorics of the past, today’s drag panic demonises LGBTQ people and calls for censorship and the banning of drag performances. This review article provides a wide overview of the art of modern drag, origins of drag panic, and its harmful ramifications. This text was originally written for the 2024 course on Media Criticism and Society as part of the Dark Play -project (“Synkkä leikki”) in the Digital Culture, Cultural Heritage and Landscape program at the University of Turku, and was revisited and last modified in the summer of 2025.

On a Saturday night in November of 2022, a mass shooting took place at Club Q, a Colorado Springs gay bar in Colorado, USA. The shooting resulted in the deaths of five people and over twenty injuries, nineteen caused by gunfire. This attack targeted the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) community, and is an exemplary case of a hate crime of extreme violence towards sexual and gender minorities. 

A drag show was hosted at Club Q on the night of the shooting. The following day, the club was scheduled to host a drag musical brunch (New York Times 21.11.2022), a midday family-friendly entertainment event featuring age-appropriate drag performances and a relaxed brunch dining experience. Following the shooting, the expected drag brunch was cancelled. Although the motives behind the attack were first unknown, members of the LGBTQ community, including the co-owners of Club Q, speculated that hosting drag shows might have contributed to the gunman’s decision, fuelled by right-wing anti-drag rhetoric and hatred (Harris 2023, 124; CNN 14.12.2022). Conservative activist Christopher Rufo expressed such sentiments a month prior to the shooting in an article for The City Journal, a conservative policy magazine, particularly framing drag queens and LGBTQ individuals as implicit child groomers (Marwick et al. 2024, 476). 

Casualties, injuries, calls for censorship, and further stigmatisation of sexual and gender minorities are some of the direct consequences of the anti-LGBTQ hatred that continues to rise during the 2020s, and more specifically, extremely harmful ramifications of the emergence of drag panic all over the world. This paper examines the central themes surrounding moral panics and introduces a framework to understand the crux of drag panic in the age of modern conservatism and sweeping disinformation.

Moral Panics and the Art of Drag

The term ‘moral panic’ was developed by sociologist Stanley Cohen while working on his PhD in the 1960s, which was the base for his first book entitled Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (1972). In this work, a moral panic is described as a term to express mass anxiety, fear, or scare over a condition, episode, person, or group of people that is considered a threat to “societal values and interests” (Cohen 2011, 1). From this perspective, moral panics arise when a community perceives their cultural and moral values threatened by an external agent (namely, folk devil), thus creating an intense, oftentimes irrational, widespread feeling of fear amongst its members. 

Goode et al. (1994) add to Cohen’s definition of moral panic by stating that “as with all sociological phenomena, threats are culturally and politically constructed, a product of the human imagination” (150–151). On this basis, it would seem that moral panics will always emerge in our society. Although threats to traditional morality and pervasive beliefs can and will be inflated by the media, moral panics are rarely permanent, as panics are in themselves “self-limiting, temporary and spasmodic, a splutter of rage which burns itself out” (Cohen 2011, xxxvii). Yet even though some moral panics are short-lived and do not seem relevant today (e.g., the moral panic over role-playing games such as Dungeons & Dragons during the 1980s), other panics will ultimately have more serious, long-lasting repercussions in society. 

On this basis, drag panic is a type of moral panic rooted in the perception of drag being inherently sexual and, thus, harmful to minors. This pervasive rhetoric is primarily used by conservative activists as an ideological disinformation narrative to cause harm to sexual and gender minorities (Marwick et al. 2024, 460). Such rhetoric can be found in the writings of conservative authors like Chrisopher Rufo, who claims that drag is about “reformulating children’s relationship with sex, sexuality, and eroticism” and its goal is “the abolition of restrictions on the behavior at the bottom end of the moral spectrum—pedophilia” (Rufo 2022). In that regard, Harris (2023) considers that drag queens are depicted as a “present-day version of the predatory homosexual,” (156) a recurrent and harmful trope used in anti-LGBTQ movements throughout history, seen in Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children campaign during the 1970s, and previous moral panics, such as the Lavender Scare of the 1950s.

As we delve further into the complexity of drag panic, we must understand what drag is and what is not. Rufo’s claims aside, the art of drag can raise big questions for those unfamiliar to it. Is it just cisgender gay men cross-dressing as women in big wigs, heels, an abundance of make-up, and sequined dresses? Is it lip-syncing in front of a live audience? Is it hyper-sexual, is it tongue-in-cheek and humorous, is it a political statement? Is it ever family-friendly?

A simple answer for all the questions above is it can be. Drag can be elaborate, drag can be sexual, drag can be goofy. On the other hand, drag can be simple, drag can be family-friendly, drag can be serious. As with any art form, drag encompasses several artistic expressions. In The Big Reveal: An Illustrated Manifesto of Drag (2023), American drag queen and artist Sasha Velour (Alexander Hedges Steinberg, 1987–) explores the history and theory of drag, and addresses the complex question of what drag is based on her research, art, and memoir. Derived from the notion that drag is never exactly one thing but always many things at once (131), Velour asserts that “drag exists in conversation with community, reflecting the world around us and celebrating, stylizing, critiquing, and reinventing it in service of something better” (135). 

In academia, drag is understood as an art form where its performers attempt to present “new, altered, transgressive, or, most importantly, parodic gender identities within the context of performance” (Moore 2013, 17). Drag performers adopt a drag persona through which to portray an exaggerated gender expression; those who exaggerate femininity are known as drag queens, while their masculine counterparts are known as drag kings. These drag personas portrayed by the performers include names and mannerism that make the presentation of their characters unique and recognisable. Although drag has been closely linked to cross-dressing, modern drag proves to be more complex than that (Moore 2013, 18–19). By playing with elements of femininity and masculinity in their performances, drag queens and kings show “multiple ways to practice and experience gender” (Berkowitz & Belgrave 2010, 161–162), by displaying “humour, wit, and comedy for the audience” (Campana et al. 2022, 1967). Overall, drag is a performance art, a creative, staged, and imaginative type of entertainment that explores and often challenges traditional gender norms.

Generally, drag performers are part of sexual, gender, and racial minorities. As Velour (2023) explains, drag performance is part of queer history because it is the LGBTQ community “who has fought the hardest to protect this art” (7). Harris (2023) supports this notion, asserting that drag “serves as an important connection to LGBTQ culture” (129). Our understanding of modern drag has its roots in the late 19th century in the US, and can be traced back to African-American activist and formerly enslaved man William Dorsey Swann (1858–1923), a gay black man who hosted private parties or balls in his home called drags, “where he would perform in elegant feminine attire” and “were mostly attended by fellow formerly enslaved people” (GLAD Law 2023). 

Racial minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, have been involved in the evolution of modern drag culture. Strong drag communities bloomed in the New York ballroom scene of the 1980s, a subculture mostly made up of marginalised queer people of colour (Fitzgerald & Marquez 2020, 33). The origin of a collection of cultural expressions and traditions in modern drag that are now part of a larger cultural mainstream, such as vogueing or the art of shade, can be traced back to the ballroom scene. Likewise, ballroom culture redefined the terminology around drag (Velour 2023, 23). With this in mind, modern drag allows and celebrates elements of queerness, gender, and ethnicity to circulate freely and often overlap.

Drag is a skilled artistic expression no different from a staged theatrical performance. It is within this context that the core questions of this review article emerge: why is there a growing anti-drag movement right now? How did it come to be? And, more importantly, how did this movement become such a widespread moral panic?

Drag Story Hour

It has previously been established that the current drag panic is largely caused by viewing drag as an inherently sexual performance that is not suited for children. Although drag queens are now being targeted by this rhetoric, the demonisation of LGBTQ people in regard to children is anything but new. In the comparative study Child-Sacrificing Drag Queens (2024), Marwick et al. explore the history of harmful narratives used by anti-LGBTQ movements in the past and present. They establish that throughout history, expressions of queerness have been perceived as a folk devil, as to be queer “is to be a moral threat to heteronormativity” (Marwick et al. 2024, 460). 

In this vein, the marginalisation and stigmatisation of LGBTQ people throughout history has highly affected how drag is perceived. For example, queer people were subject to prosecution through several laws during the late 19th and 20th centuries, many of which criminalised acts like sodomy and cross-dressing (Harris 2023, 154–155). It is particularly the breaking of societal norms surrounding gender and sexual orientation and expression that has led to the stigmatisation of drag in the past (Campana et al. 2022, 1951). At its core, today’s drag panic is not too different. 

From 2020 onwards, one of the perceived threats within the context of drag panic has been Drag Story Hour[1] (DSH). The umbrella term is used to describe children’s literacy and artistic events to promote reading, diversity, and tolerance which are hosted by drag performers in public libraries, schools, and bookstores. As of June 8, 2025, the goals of DSH described in their official website are to work towards “a future where all people learn via LGBTQIA+ storytelling to embrace themselves and champion free expression in their communities” (Drag Story Hour 2025). The DSH initiative originated in San Francisco in 2015, but has since expanded across North America, Europe, and Australia, having over 50 chapters worldwide (Ellis 2022, 95). Starting as drag queens reading to children, DSH has now expanded into implementing larger literary and creative programs for children. 

The War on DSH: A Global Movement

The growing popularity and visibility of these events have made them extremely controversial and a target of anti-drag and anti-LGBTQ activism. Public libraries have particularly been attacked by this growing movement. For example, in Sweden, some public libraries scheduled to host DSH events in the autumn of 2022 were the target of heated debates, despite DSH’s goals of inclusion and acceptance aligning “with the objectives of Swedish cultural policy and library regulations” (Engström 2024, 239). The correlation between this conflict and the spread of drag panic in the year 2022 is not coincidental. Although conservatives have been pushing for the ban of LGBTQ literature in schools and public libraries as they deem it inappropriate for minors, the current war on DSH stands out among other forms of LGBTQ censorship as “its main target is not specific book titles nor specific speakers, but the method in which stories are presented to children” (Ellis 2022, 95). That is to say, the pressing issue is not the material read at DSH, but the manner in which it’s read.

The pushback against DSH is not a mere matter of public and social media debate. Numerous protests have been held outside venues scheduled to host DSH events all around the globe. For example, among the hundreds of anti-LGBTQ demonstrations that took place in 2022 and 2023 in the US, over 161 protests and threats specifically targeted drag events and DSH (GLAAD 2023). 

In Finland, a group of anti-drag activists gathered outside of the Helsinki Central Library Oodi in 2022 to protest against satutuokio belonging to Helsinki Pride, hosted by Finnish drag queen Gaylien 2000 (Yle 1.7.2023). After around 20 protesters were removed by police, the event was able to take place in the public library (Figure 2 & 3). While these kinds of non-violent protests have taken place in Finland, other countries have seen stronger negative reactions, including harassment and intimidation both online and in person, assault, and property damage (Ellis 2022, 95). As opposed to the message of inclusion and literacy that DSH works towards, the one sent by protesters is one of intolerance, prejudice, and discrimination.

In the report A Year of Hate: Understanding Threats and Harassment Targeting Drag Shows and the LGBTQ+ Community (Squirrel & Davey 2023), the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) reviews the growth of the anti-LGBTQ movement in the Americas, Europe, and Australia in 2022. More specifically, in this document, the ISD focuses on the current anti-drag activism by examining over 200 anti-drag mobilisations at a global scale. 

The report identifies the US as the main anti-drag actor in the anti-LGBTQ movement, with the largest number of anti-drag protests and the highest number of violence attributed to the cause (Squirrel & Davey 2023, 5). While the previously discussed Colorado Springs shooting is an act of extreme violence towards the LGBTQ community and drag performers, other acts of violence include vandalism, doxxing, violent threats, and harassment towards performers and venues that host drag events both in person and online (Squirrel & Davey 2023, 11). Furthermore, many US states have been trying to pass new anti-drag legislation since 2023, especially in Western states like Oklahoma and within the Bible Belt, like Tennessee and Florida (NBC News 1.6.2023). The proposal and passing of regulations and legislations is also a consequence of moral panics (Goode et al. 1994, 168–169). By vocally condemning drag through organised demonstration, protesters call for the banning of Drag Story Hour and censorship of LGBTQ materials in public libraries and schools. 

As already noted, the biggest narrative surrounding the current drag panic is the framing of drag as inherently being harmful to children, shielding behind the narrative of drag being an inherent sexualised performance. Anti-drag activists often justify their actions under the excuse of “protecting children” (Squirrel & Davey 2023, 12). In other words, even if political actions become violent or directly harm drag performers, anti-drag advocates consider them a rightful response against a growing threat against morality: drag. As noted by Goode et al. (1994), hostility is one of the biggest characteristics of moral panics, following concern (156-159). When a moral panic emerges, there is an increased and expected level of hostility and violence towards groups of people who engage in the alleged threatening behaviour. Therein surges the mentality of us, the morally correct people, versus them, those who oppose a threat to our values and, therefore, are evil (Goode et al. 1994, 157). Drag panic follows the same dichotomy: anti-drag activists view themselves as the good in the fight, a folk hero battling the villain, drag, a folk devil standing against societal values. 

News and Disinformation: The Driving Force Behind Modern Moral Panics?

Cohen (2011) maintains that news is often the main source of information “about the normative contours of a society” (11). In other words, the news plays a big role in framing narratives of right and wrong, of correctness and deviance to large audiences. News networks are responsible to feed information to news consumers, and when this information is tailored to fit the ideological preferences of a specific audience, the already existing bias against groups of people can be strengthened. 

Take the American news channel Fox News as an example. Fox News is known to have a bias towards the Republican Party and against the Democratic party, as it presents information from a conservative standpoint and, as a result, a strong link is established between broadcaster and the political affiliation of its consumers (Hoewe et al. 2021, 368). Fox News has, for instance, been an active agent in framing conservative narratives around immigration in America. [2] The framing of immigration as invasion by Fox News portrays Latin American immigrants as a threat, thus further dehumanising and stigmatising Hispanic immigrants (Hoewe et al. 2021, 382). With American president Donald Trump regularly employing anti-immigration rhetoric in rallies during his 2024 presidential campaign (e.g., stating that immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country,” [Reuters 17.12.2023]), and reports of over 70 % of Republicans wanting immigration decreased in the country (Gallup 13.7.2023), Fox News becomes an echo chamber for its conservative viewers. 

In a similar manner, conservative news networks like Fox News are active actors in the anti-drag and anti-LGBTQ movement of today. The rhetoric used by conservative news networks converge into a “collective narrative structure” driven by conspiracy theories and “targeted disinformation campaigns” (Marwick et al. 2024, 475). A 2023 study by American non-governmental LGBTQ advocacy organisation Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) found that multiple drag shows were first targeted by news outlets like Fox News and the Daily Wire prior to in-person anti-drag demonstrations taking place. The report explains that these conservative news networks would misinterpret upcoming drag shows, “spinning them as harmful to children, and protests or threats would follow” (GLAAD 2023). This, undoubtedly, factors in the growth and spread of drag panic in the US and its global dissemination through conservative social media channels. 

Harris (2023) expands on the topic by explaining that these conservative news outlets and social media channels further the anti-drag sentiment by pushing the narrative that “drag performers are corrupting the minds of children with gender ideology, grooming and sexualizing children, and, overall, corrupting our society’s moral compass” (154). In doing so, the group of society that is constantly fed this biased and false information begins to believe such a threat is real. Goode et al. (1994) describe this widespread agreement (consensus) as another key characteristic of moral panics (156–159). However, it is important to note that although moral panics see members of a society reaching general agreement regarding a supposed emergent threat, this percentage of the population do not need to make the majority (Goode et al. 157). That is to say, moral panics can cause great fear and concern in certain groups of our society; sometimes these groups make the majority, and sometimes they do not. 

Drag Culture in the Mainstream

As I have stated throughout the text, Drag Story Hour finds itself at the centre of the drag panic of the 2020s. Its mere existence threatens the value of conservatives who believe these events can be harmful to kids, be it because of narratives that frame drag as a sexualised performance, or because the goals of DSH include advocating for inclusion and acceptance of LGBTQ people. At the same time, although the Drag Story Hour project began in 2015, drag panic has spread and grown stronger in the 2020s. A factor that may influence the current focus on drag is the introduction of drag culture into the mainstream media. 

Today, drag has become a larger cultural phenomenon, gaining growing and steady visibility during the 2010s than in decades prior (Ellis 2022, 107). From television series, to music, film, and social media, drag has made its presence felt during the past decade. Harris (2023) credits American drag queen RuPaul Charles as one of the biggest contributors of drag in mainstream society (133). In this respect, the American reality competition television series RuPaul’s Drag Race (RPDR [Logo, VH1, MTV 2009 –]) particularly stands out. 

With over sixteen seasons, spin-offs, as well as numerous international adaptations, and plenty Emmys and accolades, Drag Race is responsible for bringing drag culture to a large audience all across the world (Martinez Ziegler 2024). The premise of the original RPDR series is to have a group of drag queens competing in several challenges to earn the title of America’s Next Drag Superstar and a cash prize of $200,000. Contestants, also known as racers, get to showcase their skills in makeup, dance, comedy, and overall drag performance throughout the entire competition, while RuPaul acts as the host and main judge of the show. 

Modern television, particularly in the case of reality television, is highly affective: it aims to provoke, challenge, and generate emotions in the viewer (Tuomi 2019, 48). Although it varies from program to program, this is often achieved by amplifying the “spontaneous” situations captured by the camera. At the same time, television can become a medium where to open dialogue about topics that are often viewed as taboo (Tuomi 2019, 54; Tuomi, 2022). All of these elements are present in RPDR. Whether it is through scripted conflicts between two or more contestants and encouraging the viewer to take a side, or by bringing hurtful queer pasts and experiences under spotlight by discussing the marginalisation of sexual and gender minorities in the show, RPDR aims to keep the audience engaged by generating reactions with every episode. In doing so, the show further encourages its audience to question what genuine solidarity is, and what political causes are worth fighting for (Hermes 2023, 142).

For example, Tuomi (2019) explains that confession cam segments are used in reality TV to show a person’s personality, emotions, and thoughts to the viewer (67). These reflective segments are a big part of RPDR. Each episode includes confession cam segments throughout the entire episode, where contestants are shown out of drag (i.e., as the “real” queer people behind the drag persona). Brennan & Gudelunas (2017) stress the importance of these segments for the narrative of the show, explaining that it is through them that the audience gets to know how their queer identities are formed “by experiences of pain, abandonment, rejection and abuse, as well as those of love, partnership, re-connection and support” (31). In other words, RPDR does not only bring drag performances into the mainstream, but queer experiences as well. 

From the late 2010s onwards, the overall success of the Drag Race franchise extends beyond television, with former contestants “taking over YouTube and Instagram, and getting Netflix specials” after their appearances on the show (Harris 2023, 133–134). Case in point, American drag queen Trixie Mattel (Brian Firkus, 1989–) has become one of the most well-known drag queens in the world, gaining a lot of fame after her appearance in the seventh season of the show and winning the third instalment of the spin-off series RuPaul’s Drag Race: All Stars in 2018. Apart from being known for her high-camp style of drag and comedy, Trixie has built a multimedia empire consisting of her own make-up line, Trixie Cosmetics, four music albums, international tours, several web series including Netflix’s I Like to Watch (2019–), and a motel, which renovation was covered in Discovery’s docuseries Trixie Motel (2022–), to name a few. Several drag performers have followed similar paths after their Drag Race career and have thus played a role in making the presence of drag felt in our everyday lives. 

Although the introduction of drag culture into the mainstream creates many positive outcomes, especially in the context of destigmatising the lives and experiences of sexual and gender minorities, it also turns drag performers into targets of hate crimes (The Washington Post 21.8.2022). Drag is more visible than ever before, more accessible; it does not only occur in underground clubs and hidden venues as it once did. Drag can be spotted in popular media, at local bookstores and libraries, and even in the makeup aisle at the department store. It is this prevailing presence in our society that is perceived as a threat and challenge to conservative values, which is where drag panic truly stems from; a newfound active threat to the morals of society that is “uncontrollable, unknowable, unfamiliar” (Goode et al. 1994, 163). 

Conclusion

As I have been examining throughout my text, Drag Story Hour has found itself at the very centre of drag panic during the past couple of years. The hundreds of protests and threats that have emerged in the 2020s have targeted drag performers, public venues where DSH is held, and the very values and objectives of the program. However, the false narratives adopted by conservative groups and anti-drag activists echo intolerant and homophobic remarks that have been utilised in anti-LGBTQ movements throughout history. 

Goode et al. (1994) suggest that moral panics can be built upon older ones (169). The grooming narrative implemented by anti-drag activists is part of a much older anti-LGBTQ rhetoric, which can be found, for instance, in Anita Bryant’s 1977 Save Our Children campaign, the first organised opposition to LGBTQ rights in the US that aimed to keep gay people out of public and social life (The Washington Post 24.7.2023). In fact, Harris (2023) considers that the greater anti-LGBTQ movement of today mirrors the late 19th century’s “concerns around gender and sexual deviation” (154–155). Because queer lives challenge heteronormative norms, panics that surround them view their existence as a threatening behaviour. 

To summarise, the anxieties and disproportional fear that drive drag panic are not new. They are built upon already existing anti-LGBTQ sentiments and narratives that demonise gender and sexual minorities. The visibility of drag culture in today’s society thanks to its introduction into the mainstream, as well as the push towards tolerance and acceptance of gender and sexual minorities during the past decade mark a key difference in the moral panic of today. Within this framework, I argue that this perceived modern “openness” has been translated into a growing and imminent threat to traditional values by conservative thinkers, fuelled by disinformation and conspiracy theories. In true moral panic fashion, the consequences of the modern drag panic are acts of extreme violence, discrimination, and criminalisation of drag. The pendulum swings, and its current trajectory seems to be towards intolerance.

“There are windows of openness in our culture. And then our culture closes those windows down just as fast. (…) In a culture, you can choose fear or love. It’s been my experience and my observation that humans on this planet feel more comfortable with fear rather than love and openness. So, the future of drag? Who knows what it is. I do know what history tells us about humans. And humans, they actually don’t feel very comfortable with openness and freedom. They really don’t.”

RuPaul Charles (Metro Weekly 7.4.2016)

References

All links verified 9.6.2025.

Figures

Figure 1

BBC News 19.06.2023. ”Stockholm’s deputy mayor hosts drag queen story hour”. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0fw1d9n

Figure 2

Kansalainen 1.7.2022. Nina Metsälä: ”Helsingin keskustakirjasto Oodin edessä pidettiin 1.7. mielenosoitus pikkulasten groomausta vastaan”. https://www.kansalainen.fi/helsingin-keskustakirjasto-oodin-edessa-pidettiin-1-7-mielenosoitus-pikkulasten-groomausta-vastaan

Figure 3

Keskustakirjasto Oodi 2022. ”Kiitos herttaiselle Gaylien 2000 -alienille. Facebook. July 1, 2022. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5681998721813072

Figure 4

Women & the American Story (WAMS). n.d. Anti LGBTQ+ Activism. Resource. https://wams.nyhistory.org/end-of-the-twentieth-century/the-information-age/anti-lgbtq-activism/

SASKTODAY.ca. 16.10.2022. Jon Perez ”Protesters, LGBTQ supporters clash over children’s storytelling event”. https://www.sasktoday.ca/central/local-news/protesters-lgbtq-supporters-clash-over-childrens-storytelling-event-5964535

Figure 5

Deadline 16.08.2024. Armando Tinoco: ”‘RuPaul’s Drag Race’ Renewed For Season 17 At MTV; Paramount+ Picks Up ‘RuPaul’s Drag Race All Stars’ For Season 10”. https://deadline.com/2024/08/rupauls-drag-race-season-17-mtv-all-stars-season-10-paramount-plus-1236041806/

Figure 6

Trixie Cosmetics 2024. ”The million dollar question.” Facebook. August 26, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/TrixieCosmetics1/posts/pfbid02a4PGcRhVPfK2pQKna7DjtVNkUstentf3EdzsbUpjFFpxZ61hKYCPUdRUVsperXxJl

The Fashion Doll Chronicles 13.11.2021. ”Integrity Toys makes a Mattel! Trixie Mattel!”. https://fashiondollchronicles.com/fashiondollchronicles/2021/11/13/integrity-toys-makes-a-mattel-trixie-mattel

Trixie Mattel. n.d. ”Icon, Legend & Star”. Linktree. https://linktr.ee/trixiemattel

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Notes

[1] Also known as Drag Queen Story Hour, Drag Queen Storytime, and Drag Story Time.

[2] For more information on this, see Understanding Trump Supporters’ News Use: Beyond the Fox News Bubble (2021), Sadie Dempsey et al.; Media: Fox News, Racism, and White America in the Age of Trump (2021), Kalemba Kizito; Media Coverage of LGBT Issues: Legal, Religious, and Political Frames (2019), Scott N. Nolan.